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Abstract  
 
We investigate the causal mechanisms underlying the effect of agricultural policies directed 
toward pastoralist households in Niger on their dietary intake. To do so, we conduct a causal 
mediation analysis while referring to theoretical agricultural household models. The 
presumed mediator of interest is the annual profit from pastoral activities. We decompose 
the total effect of selected policies on pastoralist dietary intake into an indirect effect, i.e., the 
effect that operates through profits, and a residual direct effect. Using an agro-pastoral survey 
conducted in Niger in 2016, the effects of extension services associated with better access to 
markets are found to be channeled through households’ annual profits from cattle and sheep 
raising, while this is not the case for private veterinary services and low-cost livestock feed 
programs. Extension services may foster specialization in cattle and sheep raising, which may 
incentivize households to move toward a nomadic lifestyle and change their food habits and 
thereby have detrimental consequences on their calorie intake. Besides, other life choices 
could be spurred or hampered by policies, such as migrations and radicalization. 
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4 
I. Introduction
The Sahel region is one of the poorest in the world. The Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO, 2016) estimates that an average of 20 
million people suffer from malnutrition and food insecurity in the region each year, 
mainly during the lean season. It also estimates that in 2016, nearly 6 million 
children under five were acutely malnourished, which may explain approximately 
one-third of child mortality in the Sahel. Other researchers, such as van 
Wesenbeeck, Keyzes and Nubé (2009), find a lower prevalence of hunger and 
higher and less inequality spread mean calorie intake in Africa than does the FAO. 
However, undernutrition still appears to be severe in the Sahel. 
For decades, Sahelian countries have tried, individually or jointly, to provide 
solutions to this problem through agricultural policies. One of the key sectors on 
which these policies have focused is pastoralism, which is well fitted to the 
agroecological conditions in this region and is the main source of income for many 
households. 
This is the case for a regional project supporting pastoralism called "PRAPS", 
which is financed by the World Bank and involves six Sahelian countries (Burkina 
Faso, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Senegal and Mali). One of the main objectives of 
this project is to improve the income, productivity, sustainability and resilience of 
pastoral livelihoods. It is assumed that this improvement should enable 
households to enhance their nutritional intake. We base our analysis on the Niger 
survey of this project. 
One difficulty in analyzing this policy strategy is that households live in an 
imperfect market context, and consequently, their production and consumption 
decisions are not separable (de Janvry & Sadoulet, 2006). Several authors1 have 
shown, in diverse developing contexts, that a household’s production strategies can 
influence its nutritional and health statuses beyond the effect of varying 
agricultural profit. However, household agricultural profit remains the indicator 
most widely used by analysts to monitor the success of agricultural policies. 
1 Carletto, Ruel, Winters, & Zezza, 2015; Dillon, McGee, & Oseni, 2015; Muller, 
2009 
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Therefore, it still seems useful to examine how improving agricultural income can 
improve nutrition. 
 
One issue is that the health and nutrition status of producers may directly affect 
their productivity and efficiency, as found by Croppenstedt & Muller (2000) in 
Ethiopia. This implies that endogeneity issues affecting production income may 
arise when estimating an equation determining nutrition intake in which 
agricultural outputs or profits are included as explanatory factors. 
The path of policy effects on nutrition through agricultural income can be 
illustrated by using Agricultural Households Models (AHMs) that theoretically 
combine producer and consumer decisions (Squire, Strauss & Singh, 1986). There 
are two types of AHMs: separable and non-separable. For separable AHMs, it is 
assumed that markets are complete and perfectly competitive. In that case, 
households are price takers in all markets for all the commodities that they 
consume or produce. Their production decisions are independent of their 
consumption and labor supply decisions, but the reverse is not true. Households 
may be seen as first making production decisions that maximize their farm profit 
and then making decisions on their consumption and family labor supply, given 
their full income that includes their farm profits. Then, the focus of most 
agricultural policies on farm profits borrows some theoretical foundations from 
considering separable AHMs. 
In contrast, in the case of non-separable AHMs, it is often assumed that at least 
one market is missing or imperfect. Households no longer behave as profit-
maximizing producers, and their production, consumption and labor supply 
decisions are jointly (instead of recursively) determined. This implies that the 
prices of all consumer goods and all household characteristics, including consumer 
preferences, can affect production decisions. Thus, non-separable AHMs provide a 
theoretical foundation for extending the focus of agricultural policies, not only to 
farm productivity and output levels, instead of agricultural profit, but also on other 
dimensions of household situations. 
When dealing with these two approaches, a legitimate question is to what extent 
an increase in the income of agricultural households may contribute to improving 
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their nutritional intake. Another question is, in the first place, whether 
agricultural policies have a positive impact on agricultural household income. 
Answering these two questions is well suited to the separable AHM perspective, in 
which the effects of agricultural policy on nutrition should pass exclusively through 
an increase in agricultural profit. 
A few authors have already looked into these two questions, although most of them 
have focused on one question only: the effect of agricultural production on nutrition 
(e.g., Carletto et al., 2015). These studies highlight the complex nature of the 
relationship between agriculture and household food and nutritional security and 
emphasize other factors (e.g., resource allocation, intrahousehold dynamics, 
networks) that may affect this relationship. These analyses may be more 
consistent with the non-separable AHM perspective. However, the mechanisms by 
which agricultural policies impact household nutrition intake remain largely 
unclear. 
Investigating whether agricultural policies have a positive impact on households’ 
agricultural profits and whether this positive impact is fully translated into 
households’ nutritional intake will help us to shed light on these mechanisms 
linking agriculture and rural households’ food and nutrition intake. 
To do this, we will examine a variety of policies and investigate their effect through 
household agricultural profit or through other channels. We will conduct a causal 
mediation analysis of these polices by using methods akin to those discussed in 
Heckman and Pinto (2013) and in Vanderweele (2015). Causal mediation analysis 
has already been used to analyze the impact of campaigns promoting staple food 
adaption on dietary intake (de Braw et al., 2018) but not specifically in the context 
of agricultural household models. Specifically, in this investigation, household 
agricultural profit is examined as a potential mediator of interest in policies, in 
line with the theory of the AHM. We apply this new approach to the case of Niger 
and three types of policies: (i) extension services, (ii) veterinary services, and (iii) 
input subsidies. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, 
we present the context of the study and the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
strategy, while Section 5 reports the estimation results. Finally, Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
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II. The Context 
II.1. The livestock sector, poverty and malnutrition in Niger 
 
Niger is a landlocked country with a land area of 1,267,000 square kilometers and 
a population of 17 million in 2014. The annual population growth rate is 
approximately 3.3 percent. The country’s economy is essentially based on the 
agricultural sector, with a large contribution from the livestock sector. In fact, 40 
percent of Niger’s GDP is derived from the agricultural sector, and 11 percent is 
derived from the livestock sector (Ministère de l’Elevage, 2016). 
The livestock sector is a mainstay of the country’s economy. Of Niger’s total 
population, 87 percent is involved in this sector as a primary or secondary activity, 
while 10 percent of rural households’ income, up to 43 percent for households in 
pastoral zones, comes from livestock (Ministère de l’Elevage, 2016). 
In a survey conducted in 2011 by the National Institute of Statistics in Niger on 
living standards and agriculture, Zezza & Issa (2012) found that 77 percent of the 
4,000 households interviewed raise livestock. They also show that in rural areas 
in 2005, four out of five households in this survey hold or keep on average 2.8 
Tropical Livestock Units (TLUs)2 per household. 
Haan (2016) indicates that between 2008 and 2013, based on their income or 
expenditure levels, up to 30 percent of the pastoral and agro-pastoral populations 
are “very poor”, while 30 percent are “poor”, 20 percent are considered to be 
“middle” and 20 percent to be “well-off”. However, measured monetary income 
typically omits the asset value of livestock, which may lead to underestimating the 
wealth of these households. It also misses the role of livestock as a source of 
insurance and prestige. 
Currently, the combined effects of climate change, drought, flooding and 
desertification, and demographic pressure have brought the pastoral economy to 
disarray. In the purely pastoral sector, the mean livestock ownership is 1.9 TLU 
                                                          
2 Tropical Livestock Units are livestock numbers converted to a common unit. Conversion factors 
are: cattle = 0.7, sheep = 0.1, goats = 0.1, pigs = 0.2, chickens = 0.01.  See the International Food 
Research Institute and Harvest Choice : http://harvestchoice.org/data/an05_tlu for more details. 
The benchmark tropical livestock unit is commonly taken to be an animal of 250 kg liveweight 
(International Livestock Centre for Africa, 1988). 
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per capita, versus 0.6 TLU per capita in the agro-pastoral sector. According to 
Haan (2016), these levels are low when compared to “the minimum required to 
meet basic needs, avoid livestock inbreeding, and recover from drought, which is 
between 2.5 and 4 TLU per capita for pastoralist households and half of that for 
agro-pastoralist households”. This is a matter of concern because below this level, 
it is difficult for households to move out of poverty even in favorable periods. In 
contrast, those above this threshold should not only be able to regenerate herds 
after droughts but also use their animals to maintain the social networks on which 
they can rely during critical periods. 
Niger is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world, with 20 percent of rural 
households being food insecure in any given year (Ballo & Bauer, 2013). In 2010, 
26.8 percent of agro-pastoralist households were most affected by food insecurity, 
and during this year, the global acute malnutrition (GAM) among children under 
five years of age was very severe in agro-pastoral and pastoral areas. For the 
Tilaberi region, the GAM was up to 14.8 percent, which is near the WHO threshold 
of 15 percent (United State Agency for International Development, 2011). This 
extreme situation was largely a consequence of the 2009/2010 food crisis, which 
was characterized by harvest collapse, very short rainfall, and consecutive years of 
prolonged droughts. 
 
II.2 Agricultural policies in Niger to alleviate poverty and food insecurity 
In 2011, one year after the food crisis, the country put in place a long-term 
agricultural and food policy program, denoted “Initiative 3N: les Nigériens 
Nourissent les Nigériens” (Nigeriens Feed Nigeriens). The aim of this program is 
to end famine and malnutrition in the country and should be completed by 2035. 
In the livestock sector, the goals of this policy are (i) to increase fodder availability 
by creating livestock feed warehouses, livestock feed banks, mills, and municipal 
supply centers; (ii) to increase water availability by digging wells; (iii) to develop 
vaccination for animals; (iv) to enhance extension services targeted toward 
pastoral and agro-pastoral households; and (v) to give fodder, multi-nutrient block 
and fodder seeds to vulnerable pastoralist and agro-pastoralist households. 
Études et Documents n° 18, CERDI, 2019
9 
 
This research analyzes how these components of Initiative 3N affect the 
nutritional intake of these households through their agricultural profit, or 
otherwise. In particular, we focus on three policies: (i) extension services, (ii) 
private veterinary services and (iii) low-cost livestock feed. 
 
Extension services 
These services include two types of professional advice: the first is related to the 
use of livestock feed, while the second encourages households to use modern animal 
health services, appropriate breeding techniques and modern feeding. To obtain 
the first type of advice, households must visit a livestock feed bank, also called “the 
peasant’s house”. The “peasant’s houses” are held by government technical 
services, municipalities, farmers’ associations or cooperatives. The livestock feed 
bank also seeks to i) bring livestock feed closer to the most remote households and 
ii) provide a security stock that can be mobilized during the hot dry season when 
livestock feed is scarce on the market and especially expensive. The second type of 
advice is typically provided at the beginning of the pastoral campaign every year 
by farmers’ associations and by technical services of the Ministry of Livestock. 
 
Private veterinary services 
Private veterinary services complete similar public services and are delivered by 
either a simple private veterinarian or a local private veterinary service. The 
private veterinarian is generally based at the department level. He often holds a 
veterinary pharmaceutical stock with the mandate of carrying out free vaccination 
campaigns financed by the government. 
The local private veterinary services are led by a private veterinarian who runs a 
network of approximately thirty auxiliaries. These auxiliaries may be community 
agents, such as villagers chosen by the community, and trained by the private 
veterinarian. An auxiliary is a private agent who intervenes at the village level 
and covers 10 to 15 villages. The local private veterinary services and their 
auxiliaries provide households with various animal health services, such as 
vaccination, treatment of animal diseases, and advice. 
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Low-cost livestock feed (input subsidies) 
Each year, the government assesses the country’s fodder deficit and purchases 
fodder to meet needs in deficit areas. The purchased stock is disseminated in the 
peasant’s houses for sale at moderate prices. However, the purchased stock never 
covers more than 50 percent of needs (Ministère de l’Elevage, 2015). Let us now 
turn to the data used for the estimations. 
 
III. Data and variables 
III.1. Data 
This paper uses data from a specialized survey collected by the Ministry of 
Livestock in Niger. This survey was conducted for two projects: “PRAPS: Projet 
Régional d’appui au Pastoralism au Sahel” and “PASEL: Programme d’Appui au 
Secteur de l’Elevage”. The first project covers six countries in the Sahel (Niger, 
Mauritania, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Senegal); the second covers Niger only 
(Ministère de l’Elevage, 2016). 
The survey was conducted in three waves (2016, 2017, and 2018) with the same 
households in Niger. Unfortunately, we have access only to the first wave that was 
conducted in October 2016. The survey covered the seven regions of the country, 
and approximately 1,350 pastoral and agro-pastoral households were sampled. 
First, 90 villages were selected proportionally with respect to size. Then, within 
each selected village, households were drawn randomly. In each village, 
households were a priori divided into three categories (small, medium and large 
producers), according to the size of their herds, and in close collaboration with the 
villagers. 
The surveyed households were asked about their socio-demographic 
characteristics, budget, food consumption, agro-pastoral production, livestock 
holdings, agro-pastoral sales and the prices they face individually. 
We also have access to information on different shocks that these households 
suffered (shocks related to animal fodder, animal diseases, and access to water) 
and on strategies that they developed to respond to these shocks. Finally, there is 
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precise information on the access these households had to the three selected 
agricultural policies (input subsidies, veterinary services and extension services). 
We employ the Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates for each surveyed 
household to match them with climatic data on local precipitation and 
temperature. For each household, we collect from the website for NASA’s 
Prediction of Worldwide Energy Resource Project annual data on minimum, 
maximum and average temperatures in degrees Celsius at 2 meters of altitude, as 
well as annual precipitation data measured in millimeters per day. This provides 
us with valuable instrumental variables that will allow us to handle endogeneity 
problems in our regressions. 
In this study, we will focus on households that own sheep and cattle because the 
information collected on this group of households is the most complete. This leaves 
us with 600 households’ observations after cleaning the data and removing 
outliers. 
 
III.2. Construction of variables 
In this section, we present the outcome and treatment variables. We use two types 
of outcome variables (nutrition indicators and household profit from livestock 
activity) and three treatment variables, corresponding to the considered 
agricultural policies. The treatments are each described by a dummy variable that 
takes value 1 when the household reported that it had access to the policy and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Nutrition intake indicators 
Two nutrition indicators are constructed: the household dietary diversity score and 
the household’s caloric intake per capita per day. The dietary diversity score records 
how many different food groups have been consumed by the household over a given 
reference period and is a good proxy for diet quality. Following the FAO, 12 food 
groups are used to compute the dietary diversity score (Swindale & Bilinsky, 2006). 
Table 1 shows how the food products recorded as consumed by the household are 
categorized into these groups. 
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Table 1: Classification of food products 
Food group Food Product (from survey) 
A. Cereals Millet, sorghum, bread, maize, edible pasta 
B. Roots and tubers - 
C. Vegetables Condiments, okra 
D. Fruits - 
E. Meat, poultry, offal Meat, poultry 
F. Eggs - 
G. Fish and seafood Fish, 
H. Pulses/legumes/nuts Cowpea, sesame seeds, groundnuts 
I. Milk and milk products Fresh milk, curdled milk, cheese 
J. Oils/Fats Oil, butter 
K. Sugar/honey Sugar 
L. Miscellaneous Tea 
Notes: Classification made by the authors using the food groups proposed by the FAO. 
If the household reports that it consumes one of the food products belonging to a 
specific food group, an index value of 1 is attributed to this household for the 
corresponding food group, 0 otherwise. As we can see from Table 1, none of the 
foods consumed by the surveyed households belong to the food groups of roots and 
tubers, fruits or eggs. This is because the survey does not provide any information 
on the consumption of these food groups due to their low frequency for agro-
pastoralists. Finally, a dietary diversity score is computed for each surveyed 
household as the total number of food groups consumed by the household. 
 
Caloric intake per capita per day 
The caloric intake per capita per day for each household is computed by converting 
the food quantity consumed by the household into calories during the year. For 
this, we use the food composition table provided by the FAO for West Africa in 2012 
(Stadlmayr et al., 2012). We separately compute caloric intake coming from cereals 
(millet, sorghum, bread, maize and edible pasta) and from animal food products 
(meat, poultry, fish, fresh milk, curdled milk and cheese). 
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Profits from livestock activity 
The last outcome variable computed is the household’s annual profits from 
livestock activity. One of the difficulties we encountered concerns measuring these 
households’ output. After several attempts, we decided to consider only three 
outputs: cattle, sheep and milk production (fresh milk and curd), which correspond 
to the best measured information. For cattle and sheep production, we use the 
animals sold and slaughtered by the household as a measure of output because 
variations in stocks are unobserved. For milk, we use total household production. 
We were not able to take into account variation in stock for milk production 
between two years due to the lack of such information in the survey. 
All these production measures are valued at market prices3 faced by each 
household. The total amount of these production values amounts to the gross 
income of the households from pastoral activity. 
For the production costs, we are able to track four monetarily valued costs: costs 
related to the herd's health, livestock water consumption, feed consumption, and 
labor costs (for shepherds and market intermediaries for the sale of animals). 
These costs are reported by each surveyed household for the whole herd. The 
(restricted) profit is obtained by subtracting the total observed costs from the 
obtained gross income. All other unobserved costs and benefits must be neglected. 
In the next section, we briefly discuss a few descriptive statistics. 
 
III.3. Summary statistics 
Household characteristics 
Table 2a reports a few descriptive statistics for the variables used in this work. 
The average age of the household head in our sample is 45 years, and nearly 95 
percent are male. The majority of the heads (94 percent) have no education, with 
only 4 percent having received primary education. We also note that the average 
size of households is 7 members, most of whom are children. 
                                                          
3 The cattle and sheep prices are given by animal sex and age. For animals consumed by the households, we then compute 
an average price per TLU.  
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Our sample is mainly composed of households whose head belongs to the Fulani 
ethnic group (55 percent), followed by the Tuareg (23 percent) and the Haussa (14 
percent).  
Table 2a: Summary statistics 
Notes: To calculate the caloric intake from cereals and from animal food products, the considered cereals are millet, 
sorghum, bread, maize, and edible pasta, while the animal food products considered are meat, poultry, fish, fresh milk, 
curdled milk, and cheese. 
The seven regions of the country have been grouped into two zones: the 
North and the South. The North is formed by the regions of Agadez, Diffa, Maradi  
and Zinder and the South by the regions of Tahoua, Dosso and Tillabery. Most of 
the households in our sample (60 percent) live in the South. 
 
 
Variables N. Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Sociodemographic variables      
Sex of household head (1 if male) 600 0.95 0.23 0 1 
Age of household head 596 44.76 14.66 17 92 
Instruction level of household head      
- None (1 if yes and 0 otherwise) 600 0.94 0.23 0 1 
- Primary (1 if yes and 0 otherwise) 600 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Household size 600 7.14 3.68 1 25 
Number of children (0-3 years old) 600 0.82 0.97 0 6 
Number of children (4-10 years old) 600 2.02 1.66 0 9 
Number of youths (11-16 years old) 600 0.88 1.08 0 8 
Number of young adults (17-20 years old) 600 0.80 0.93 0 5 
Number of adults (>20 years old) 600 2.65 1.52 0 11 
Area of living (1 if in the South) 600 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Ethnic group      
- Tuareg (1 if yes and 0 otherwise) 600 0.23 0.42 0 1 
- Haussa (1 if yes and 0 otherwise) 600 0.14 0.35 0 1 
- Fulani (1 if yes and 0 otherwise) 600 0.55 0.49 0 1 
Livestock holding      
Number of sheep 600 10.04 31.44 0 638 
Number of cattle 600 6.55 9.36 0 61 
Livestock holding category      
Small producer  600 0.56 0.5 0 1 
Large producer 600 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Outcomes variables      
Caloric intake per capita per day(Kcal) 600 3,987 3,874 16.70 21,166 
Caloric intake per capita per day from cereals (Kcal) 600 3,242 3,222 15.66 20,984 
Caloric intake per capita per day from animal food 
product (Kcal) 
600 
208,81 980 0 12,539 
Household dietary diversity score 600 5.39 1.73 1 9 
Annual profit from livestock production (Millions of 
CFA) 
600 3.89 18.3 -1.63 257 
Policies      
Access to extension services (1 if yes and 0 otherwise) 600 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Access to private veterinary services (1 if yes and 0 
otherwise) 
600 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Access to low-cost livestock feed (1 if yes and 0 
otherwise) 
600 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Études et Documents n° 18, CERDI, 2019
15 
 
As previously stated, households were classified into three categories according to 
the size of their herds: small herders (5 sheep and 4 cattle, on average), medium 
herders (10 sheep and 8 cattle) and large herders (29 sheep and 14 cattle). The 
majority (56 percent) of households in our sample belong to the category of small 
herders. Only 15 percent of the households surveyed are large herders. When 
considering all categories, the average number of animals per household is ten for 
sheep and seven for cattle. 
 
As mentioned above, nutrition intake is measured by two indicators: caloric intake 
per capita per day and dietary diversity score. In our sample, the household dietary 
diversity score varies between 1 and 9, with an average of 5. This means that, on 
average, the surveyed households consume five different food groups during the 
year. During the year, food consumption provided an average of 3,987 Kcal per 
person per day for each household. However, 25 percent of surveyed households 
have caloric energy intakes less than 1,584 Kcal per person per day, while for 50 
percent of the households, these intakes are less than 2,775 Kcal per person per 
day. Additionally, on average, almost 83 percent of caloric intakes come from 
cereals, and only 4.4 percent strictly come from animal food products. It seems 
likely that caloric intake from animal products has not been sufficiently recorded. 
In particular, omission errors may occur due to the recall period for recording the 
consumption levels of households, which is 3 months. Therefore, households may 
have had difficulties correctly recalling the quantity of food products they 
consumed. Moreover, animal products are often mixed with vegetable products 
when consumed and may have been confused with them when describing meals. 
From Table 2a, we note that the profit level varies substantially across households. 
On average, the annual profit is 3.89 million CFA francs. During the survey period, 
25 percent of households had zero profit, and half of them had a profit above 
214,073 CFA francs. The most extreme profit loss observed is equal to nearly 1.6 
million CFA francs. This may be due partly to measurement errors and partly to 
the fact that annual profit is an imperfect measure of economic activity for 
livestock raising, the production horizon of which may extend to many years. 
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In the sample, 20 percent of households surveyed have access to private veterinary 
services, while only 19 percent and 15 percent report having access to extension 
services and low-cost livestock feed, respectively. 
Our outcome variables, the two household nutrition intake indicators and the 
profit variable, are each transformed into logarithmic form for the econometric 
analysis. When transforming the annual livestock profit into logs, we add a 
constant amount to the profit level to accommodate negative values. The 
transformed profits are therefore log (profit + constant), where the constant is 
equal to the minimum observed value of profit, in absolute terms, plus one. 
As we can see from Table 2b presented below, the outcomes of households that 
have access to a policy generally differ from those who do not. The households that 
have access to extension services have a 42 percent lower caloric intake than those 
that do not. However, their dietary diversity score is 14 percent higher than that 
of nontreated households. They also consume more animal food products and less 
cereals than those that do not have access to extension services. Households with 
access to low-cost livestock feed or private veterinary services have a higher dietary 
diversity score and consume more animal food products than cereal food products 
than households that do not have access to these policies. Regarding the annual 
profit from livestock production, we note that for the three policies considered, 
those that have access to each of these policies are better off than those that do 
not. These data are therefore appropriate for the analysis that we want to conduct, 
and we describe our empirical strategy in the next section. 
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Table 2b: Summary statistics 
Policies 
Extension services Low-cost livestock feed Private veterinary services 
No  
Access 
Access Diff 
No  
Access 
Access Diff 
No 
Access 
Access Diff 
Outcomes  
(mean values) 
         
Log of total caloric intake per capita 
per day  
7.81 
(.05) 
7.38 
(.14) 
.42*** 
(.14) 
7.71 
(.06) 
7.77 
(.12) 
-.05 
(.15) 
7.77 
(.06) 
7.54 
(.10) 
       .23* 
(.14) 
Log of caloric intake per capita per day 
from cereals food product 
7.60 
(.06) 
7.08 
(.15) 
.52*** 
(.14) 
7.49 
(.06) 
7.52 
(.12) 
-.03 
(.16) 
7.56 
(.06) 
7.26 
(.10) 
.30** 
(.14) 
Log of caloric intake per capita per day 
from animal food product 
3.73 
(.08) 
3.88 
(.19) 
-.15 
(.19) 
3.69 
(.08) 
4.15 
(.18) 
-.45** 
(.21) 
3.71 
(.08) 
3.95 
(.17) 
-.24 
(.19) 
Log of household dietary diversity 
score 
1.58 
(.02) 
1.72 
(.02) 
-.14*** 
(.04) 
1.57 
(.02) 
1.80 
(.02) 
-.23*** 
(.05) 
1.57 
(.02) 
1.76 
(.03) 
-.19*** 
(.04) 
Log of annual profit from livestock 
production 
14.69 
(.05) 
14.96 
(.09) 
-.26*** 
(.10) 
14.71 
(.04) 
14.94 
(.11) 
-.23** 
(.12) 
14.73 
(.05) 
14.83 
(.08) 
-.10 
(.10) 
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Column Diff 
show the mean difference, for the outcome variable, between the group of households that do not have access to the policy and the group that 
does have access to it.  
 
IV. Empirical Strategy 
As mentioned above, our aim is to empirically investigate the causal mechanisms 
behind the impact of agricultural policies on household nutrition intake. 
Specifically, we want to assess the role played by pastoral profits in this process. 
In contrast, mainstream policy evaluation methods focus primarily on estimating 
the average treatment effect rather than investigating the underlying causal 
channels that drive this effect. 
In the statistical literature, analyzing the causal channel through which a policy 
effect occurs, with a specific interest in the role of a particular variable, is referred 
to as causal mediation analysis4. A particular variable of interest is the mediator 
of causal effects, which in our case is the profit from livestock activity. 
Causal mediation analysis has been widely used in social science, especially in 
medicine, psychology and political science, as well as in experimental studies or 
observational studies. There is growing interest in extending the use of this 
method in economics5. Our empirical strategy is a form of causal mediation 
analysis, where we investigate the extent to which the impact of agricultural 
                                                          
4 Baron & Kenny (1986); Imai, Keele, Tingley, & Yamamoto (2011); Vanderweele (2015). 
5Heckman et al. (2013);  Heckman & Pinto (2015); Kosec, Ghebru, Holtemeyer, Mueller, 
& Schmidt (2017); De Brauw et al. (2018) 
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policies on pastoralist household nutrition in Niger is mediated by their profit from 
livestock activity. 
 
Figure 1: An illustration of our empirical strategy 
This strategy can be specified in terms of the four links (a, b, c and c’) that are 
illustrated in Figure 1. The first link represents the unmediated effect (c in Figure 
1) of the selected agricultural policies on the nutrition intake indicators for 
pastoralist households. The link a represents the effect of the selected policies on 
profits, which is the mediator, while link b represents the effect of profits on the 
household’s nutrition intake. These two links are used to assess the indirect effect 
of these policies on household nutrition intake, that is, their effect that is 
channeled through profits. The last link c’ represents the direct effect of these 
policies on household nutrition intake, that is, the effect that operates through 
channels other than the annual profit. 
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This strategy can be supported by referring to agricultural household models, 
separable or non-separable. Within this framework, causal mediation analysis may 
provide hints about the relevant type of agricultural household model for 
pastoralists in Niger. 
Figure 2: Non-separable and separable household models 
Notes: C=consumption, Q=production, L=labor, l=leisure, T=household total available time 
Indeed, in separable models, the effect of the selected agricultural policies on a 
pastoralist household’s nutrition intake should fully and exclusively pass through 
its profit from livestock activity, while this should not be the case in non-separable 
models. As explained above, with separable AHMs, households make their 
production, consumption and labor supply decisions recursively, and income from 
farm profit is the channel by which production decisions affect consumption and 
labor supply decisions and, as a result, nutrition. Moreover, household 
consumption decisions do not affect production decisions. In contrast, in non-
separable AHMs, the production and consumption decisions are made 
simultaneously, and households do not act as profit maximizers. In that case, the 
calculated profit level from the data may be nothing more than an arbitrarily 
weighted index of production levels and costs. Thus, in these conditions, it is 
unclear why it should play a full role as a mediator variable in a causal analysis. 
However, production remains entangled with consumption, and the availability of 
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empirical evidence on the share of possible causal effects of policies operating 
through production would still be valuable. 
Figure 2 illustrates the household optimization problem in two simple cases of 
separability and non-separability. In the separable case and when we consider only 
one good and one input, say labor (the sum of family labor and hired labor is 
denoted by L), the household optimization problem consists of two steps. In the 
first step, the household chooses the optimal labor time (L*) and the optimal output 
(Q*) that would maximize its profit given the prices it faces and its production 
technology. This optimal point is determined by the tangent line, which is also the 
maximum isoprofit line, to the production function curve. The realized profit is 
added to other incomes to yield the full income of the household. In the second 
stage, this full income is incorporated into the household budget constraint (which 
determines the budget line in Figure 2) that is the unique constraint (once the time 
constraint has been substituted) on the maximization of the utility function, which 
is assumed to be increasing in consumption (C) and leisure (l). The optimal 
consumption level and leisure time are determined by the tangency of the budget 
line and the optimal household indifference curve. 
In the non-separable case in which, for example, there is no market for labor, the 
optimal production and consumption levels are jointly determined. This is 
represented by the tangency of the production curve and the indifference curve. In 
that case, the profit effect vanishes. 
To analyze this causal mediation, we use a combination of cross-sectional, 
retrospective, and observational data, which were collected in 2016, five years after 
the beginning of the implementation of Initiative 3N. We do not have any 
information on these households before 2011. 
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IV.1 Estimating the unmediated effect (c) of policies 
 
In this step, we use a model of selection on observables based on the potential 
outcomes with and without treatment (i.e., with and without policy access). 
In Niger, households may choose to have access to different agricultural policies. 
In that case, they select themselves into the treatment. In this context, the 
identification of the treatment effect relies on assuming conditional mean 
independence between the treatment and the outcomes. It is thus assumed 
implicitly that all the important characteristics that affect both household 
participation and the outcome are observable. 
We evaluate the effects of the three policies separately because each policy was 
originally intended to resolve a specific problem. Therefore, depending on its needs, 
a household can decide to access them at different points in time, separately or not 
at all. For example, a household can decide to access private veterinary services 
during the dry-and-wet season, a season favorable to the development of livestock 
diseases. However, in the dry-and-hot season, it may instead decide to access the 
low-cost livestock feed program because of the scarcity of pastureland during this 
season. Thus, before deciding to access the low-cost livestock feed program, the 
effect of private veterinary services may have already been observed by the 
household since it had access to it. In this case, the household’s decision to access 
low-cost livestock feed is not simultaneous with its previous decision to access 
private veterinary services. Moreover, evaluating the simultaneous effect of the 
three policies may not be relevant in this setting because the survey does not 
provide any information on the precise time of the year when each household 
accessed a policy. 
In the literature, various methods have been developed to construct a 
counterfactual based on nonexperimental observations. We use the “inverse 
probability weighted regression adjustment” (IPWRA) method discussed in 
Wooldridge (2010), which combines regression adjustment (RA) and inverse 
probability weighting (IPW). The IPWRA benefits from the double robustness 
property with respect to misspecifications of the RA and IPW components. In RA, 
a linear regression is specified from which a predicted outcome can be obtained, 
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while no restriction is imposed about the treatment. In IPW, a logistic regression 
is used for predicting the treatment status, while no formal model is used for the 
outcome. The IPWRA approach combines the two strategies by specifying a model 
for the outcome 
                                                       
 ,i Y i iY f X    ,                                              (1) 
and another for the treatment  
                                                    Pr 1 ( , )i T iT g X     ,                                              (2)  
for households i = 1,2,3……. N, where N is the total number of households in our 
sample. In equations (1) and (2), XY is a set of covariates that influence the 
outcome, Y, and XT is a set of covariates that explain the dummy variable for 
treatment assignment, T.   and   are parameter vectors to estimate, while i  is 
an error term. The function f  can be specified as a linear function when the 
outcome is continuous, as in our case. As is typical, we specify the function g  to be 
a probit function. One advantage of the IPWRA method is that, under the usual 
ignorability assumption, one obtains a consistent estimator of the effect of the 
treatment even if one of the two models is miss-specified (Wooldridge, 2007). 
We choose covariates that vary little over time to account for the fact that the data 
were collected five years after the beginning of the implementation of Initiative 3N 
and that these stable covariates can in a sense proxy for missing pretreatment 
covariates not affected by the treatment. We lack baseline information on 
households before the policy implementation. 
The observed characteristics that are expected to affect the outcomes and 
household participation are the sex, highest reached level of instruction and age of 
the household head, the region of residence (North or South), the proportion of 
children below 3 years of age, the proportion of children between 4 and 10 years of 
age, and the proportions of youths and young adults. These characteristics can 
affect household food demand and diet composition. In fact, household composition 
may condition the type of food products that are consumed and shared within the 
household. For example, households with babies may consume more milk. 
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Additionally, some household characteristics, such as the sex of the household 
head, his age or his level of instruction, can affect its access to a given policy. 
Indeed, with a high level of instruction, households can easily access important 
information related to a policy, such as the start date and where it may take place. 
Additionally, some policies such as extension services may require a good level of 
instruction to implement the advice they provide. 
We also include the household’s ethnic group and its livestock holding category in 
the treatment models. However, for the outcome models, we do not use the 
livestock holding category as a covariate because this stratification may be too 
endogenous. 
With the IPWRA method, the treatment effect is obtained by first estimating the 
parameters of the treatment model to generate the predicted probability of being 
treated for each individual, ˆ( , )T ig X  , where ̂  is the estimate of  . The obtained 
inverse probabilities are used as weights in the regression of the outcome model 
for each treatment (0 and 1). 
Then, to estimate the parameters for a linear model of the outcome, the IPW linear 
least squares estimator is estimated separately for each treatment:                                             
 
 
0
2
0( , )
min
ˆ1 ( , )
N
i Y i
i T i
Y f X
g X




          if     0iT   ,                                   (3) 
        and                                  
 
1
2
1( , )
min
ˆ( , )
N
i Yi
i T i
Y f X
g X



           if     1iT     .                                (4) 
Finally, the average treatment effect (ATE) is obtained by computing the difference 
between the means of the predicted outcomes of the two treatment groups: 
                            1 0
1 ˆ ˆ[ ( , ) ( , )]
N
Y i Y i
i
ATE f X f X
N
    ,                                                      (5) 
where 1̂  and 0̂  are the inverse probability-weighted estimated parameters of the 
outcome model for 1iT   and 0iT  , respectively. 
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This procedure is also used to estimate the impact of the selected agricultural 
policies on the presumed mediator, i.e., the annual profit from livestock activity, 
by simply substituting it as the outcome variable. 
IV.2 The effect of the annual profit from livestock activity 
In this subsection, which corresponds to link b in Figure 1, we discuss the impact 
of the mediator on pastoralist households’ nutrition intake. To do so, we use a 
regression setting to estimate this effect with control variables (
Y iX  in the model 
below) that are the same as in the previous subsection, except that we exclude the 
livestock holding category from the covariates to avoid a possible endogeneity 
problem. 
However, as mentioned above, there might be a feedback effect between household 
production strategies and nutritional and health status or other types of 
confounders. To control for this, we run a 2SLS regression to estimate the effect of 
annual profit on nutrition intake. The two instruments are, first, a dummy for 
livestock disease and, second, local average annual temperature squared. Initially, 
we also considered temperatures in levels, but as they were always insignificant in the first stage 
equation, we dropped them and only retained the squared value. Formally, this amounts to 
jointly estimating the following two equations for each policy j:                  
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3
log( )
log( )
i ij i Y i i
i ij Y i i
profit T Z X
Y profit T X
    
    
    
    
                                                                   (6) 
The  s and  s are the parameters to be estimated, and ,i i   are the error terms 
of the second and first models, respectively. Tij represents the jth policy for the ith 
household, while Zi denotes the two instruments for this household. While not 
indicated in the notations, the parameters and errors terms vary with the 
considered policy. 
System 6 allows us to estimate the impact of the mediator on household nutrition 
intake while controlling for a household’s access to a policy. The joint presence of 
the profit and policy variables in the outcome equation allows for partial 
contributions of the direct and indirect effects to a change in outcome. In addition, 
the other controls are similar to those used for the ATE estimates for the policies. 
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The two instruments are found to be significantly correlated (the linear correlation 
coefficients are 0.16 for livestock disease and 0.15 for the local temperature 
squared) with the logarithm of household profits from pastoral activity. However, 
they must not be correlated with caloric intake or the dietary diversity score. 
Under this exclusion restriction, the instruments influence the outcome only 
through their correlations with the logarithm of pastoral profits. 
The exclusion restriction for livestock disease is justified by the fact that it is likely 
to be an unexpected external shock for households. Livestock disease should reduce 
herd fertility and milk production and thus negatively affect a household’s pastoral 
profits. When facing this type of shock, most surveyed households reported that 
they decided to sell the sick animals (30 percent of households surveyed) or to do 
nothing at all (32 percent). None of them reported that they had ex ante 
undertaken protection or insurance strategies, which supports the hypothesis that 
the shock is unanticipated. 
Our second instrument is the local maximum temperature squared, which should 
also affect household nutrition intake only through its correlation with profits. 
Indeed, climatic shocks are beyond the control of households and typically 
unanticipated, which guarantee that the exclusion restriction is satisfied. The risk 
of hydrological and agricultural droughts increases as temperature rises. Thus, 
high temperature reduces the availability of pastureland and water for animals, 
which in turn negatively affects milk production and animal weight. These 
negative impacts reduce the market value of animals, and to prevent this loss, 
households may decide to sell their animals or to migrate to areas where it is less 
hot. 
IV.3 Estimating the indirect and direct effects 
As mentioned above, the indirect effect is the effect that operates through the 
annual profit, while the direct effect (represented by link c’ in Figure 1) is the effect 
that operates through channels other than the annual pastoral profit. The sum of 
these two effects forms the total effect (represented by link c in Figure 1). 
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The indirect effect is calculated as the product of the effect of policies on the 
mediator and the effect of the mediator on household nutrition intake (a   b in 
Figure 1). The first effect a is estimated, on average, from the ATE formula in eq.5, 
while the second effect b is obtained from the System 6 estimates for parameter
1
. The direct effect (c’) is therefore measured as the effect of the policies on the 
outcome when controlling for the effect of the mediator. It is measured by the 
parameter 
2  in the second equation in System 6. The identification of this 
parameter relies on controls for the important household characteristics XY to be 
able to assume conditional independence between the treatment and outcomes. 
The confidence intervals of the estimated indirect effect are computed with the 
Monte Carlo method proposed by MacKinnon, Lockwood, and Williams (2004)6. We 
now turn to the estimation and test results. 
V. Results 
V.1. The total effects of the policies on nutritional intake 
The estimates of the unmediated, or total, effect of each of the three policies on 
nutrition intake are reported in Table 3. The hypothesis that the distribution of 
covariates is the same for both treatment statuses is not rejected for each of the 
three policies. The covariates are therefore balanced, suggesting that the 
treatment or the outcome model is well specified. The conditional independence 
assumption is not rejected at the 5 percent level (Table 3). 
For the household dietary diversity score, we note that the effects of each of the 
three policies are positive and significant. Those with access to extension services 
saw their dietary diversity score increase by 13.6 percent relative to those that did 
not. Moreover, having access to private veterinary services increases a household’s 
dietary diversity score by an almost identical extent of 12.6 percent. Finally, the 
                                                          
6 The authors propose a simulated test procedure for the indirect effect. Begin with two estimates 
for a and b and their standard errors. Using this information, simulated random normal variables 
for a and b are generated to generate a distribution of a*b values. With these values, confidence 
intervals and  p-values can be estimated by their simulated analogs. 
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total effect of deliveries of low-cost livestock feed raises the household dietary 
diversity score by 21 percent. 
Table 3: Total effect of the selected policies on household nutritional intake 
 
Log of household 
dietary diversity 
score 
Log of total caloric 
intake per day and 
per capita 
Log of caloric 
intake per day and 
per capita from 
cereals 
Log of caloric intake 
per day and per 
capita from animal 
food products 
ATE ATE ATE ATE 
Extension services      
Access to extension services 
0.136*** 
(0.03) 
-0.342** 
(0.133) 
-0.390*** 
(0.141) 
0.162 
(0.188) 
Testing covariates balance: 
(Chi-square test) 
[0.26] [0.26] [0.26] [0.79] 
Veterinary services      
Access to private veterinary 
services  
0.126*** 
(0.039) 
-0.260  
(0.173) 
-0.327* 
(0.181) 
-0.05 
(0.223) 
Testing covariates balance 
(Chi-square test) 
 [0.16] [0.16] [0.16] [0.20] 
Input subsidies      
 Access to low-cost livestock 
feed  
0.212*** 
(0.03) 
0.09  
(0.121) 
0.08 
(0.131) 
0.267 
(0.212) 
Testing covariates balance: 
(Chi-square test)  
[0.88] [0.88] [0.88] [0.88] 
Number of Observations 596 596 596 511 
Notes: ATE: Average Treatment Effect. Values in brackets are p-values, and values in parentheses are robust standard 
errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% probability levels, respectively. 
With regard to caloric intake per capita per day, only extension services have a 
significant impact. This impact decreases caloric intake per capita per day by 34 
percent for households that have access to extension services. The other two 
policies do not have any significant effects on total caloric intake. 
Distinguishing the source of the calories consumed by the household does not 
substantially change the effects of each policy when considering caloric intake from 
cereals. This suggests that the surprising negative impacts of extension services 
on total caloric intake could be explained by a decline in the consumption of cereal 
foods. 
However, the opposite policy effects are observed when examining caloric intake 
from animal food products, except for private veterinary services. For extension 
services and low-cost livestock feed programs, the results show positive policy 
effects, although they are not significant even at the 10 percent level. Nevertheless, 
a negative and very small insignificant impact is observed for private veterinary 
services. The positive effects, even if not significant, of extension services and low-
cost livestock programs are consistent with their positive effects on the dietary 
diversity score. Increasing the dietary diversity score for households with diets 
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mainly composed of cereals generally amounts to increasing their consumption of 
animal food products. The negative impact of extension services on total caloric 
intake raises the question of the origin of this negative effect. Causal mediation 
analysis will shed further light on this. 
Three hypotheses could explain this intriguing result. The first is a perverse effect 
of the selected policy, which may foster household specialization in pastoral 
activities at the expense of agricultural production. The second hypothesis is that 
it changed the food habits of pastoralist households who may substitute more 
consumption of animal food products for cereal food products. The third is 
measurement errors in caloric intake data. However, and as argued for example 
by Yi and Di (2017), when a continuous outcome is miss-measured in an additive 
model, naïve7 causal inference methods may still yield consistent estimates 
because measurement errors are confined to the error term. This is the case if the 
measurement errors in caloric intake can be seen as close to classical measurement 
errors. Examining these hypotheses, especially the first, is one of the aims of the 
next sections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Naïve means here that the causal inference method ignores the measurement error problem.  
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V.2. The effects of the policies on profit and production levels 
Table 4 reports the estimated effects of the selected policies on household pastoral 
profit and cereal and milk production levels, all in logarithms. 
Table 4: Effects of the selected policies on household profit and production levels 
 
 
Log of annual profit from 
livestock activity 
Log of annual quantity of 
milk production 
Log of annual quantity of 
cereals production 
ATE ATE ATE 
Extension services    
Access to extension services 
0.20** 
(0.095) 
0.593*** 
(0.197) 
.109 
(.157) 
Testing covariates balance (Chi-
square test) 
[0.28] [0.64] [0.62] 
Veterinary services    
Access to private veterinary 
services 
0.05 
(0.087) 
0.270 
(0.237) 
0.381  
(0.179) 
Testing covariates balance (Chi-
square test) 
[0.14] [0.79] [0.11] 
Input subsidies    
 Access to low-cost livestock feed 
0.114 
(0.102) 
0.137  
(0.211) 
-0.206  
(0.176) 
Testing covariates balance(Chi-
square test) 
[0.88] [0.98] [0.86] 
Number of Observations 595 326 482 
Notes: We consider only the three main cereal products: millet, sorghum and cowpea. ATE: Average Treatment Effect. Values in 
brackets are p-values, and values in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Only extension services have a significant and positive effect on the annual profits 
of households from livestock activity. Access to this policy increases a household’s 
annual pastoral profit by 20 percent. The effects of the two other policies on profits 
are positive but not significant. Additionally, they do not have any significant 
effects on milk production. 
In that sense, only extension services seem to have achieved some of the objectives 
assigned to them by political decision-makers, especially because they are the only 
ones with a positive and significant impact on milk production. Moreover, private 
veterinary services and low-cost livestock feed programs can also be seen as having 
failed, with positive but insignificant effects on milk production. It will therefore 
be crucial to assess whether the positive effect of the extension services on 
household profits is transmitted to nutrition intake. 
None of the three policies has a significant impact on the production levels of the 
three main cereals (millet, sorghum and cowpea)8, while for milk production, only 
extension services have a positive and significant impact. 
                                                          
8 Of the surveyed households, 85 percent produce at least one of the three cereals.   
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Extension services, the only policy that has a nonsignificant effect on cereal 
production, significantly and positively affect milk production. They also have a 
negative effect on caloric intake from cereal products and a positive effect on caloric 
intake from animal food products. Production and consumption substitution 
between cereal products and animal food products may have taken place after this 
policy, which would contribute to explaining these effects. 
 
V.3. The effects of profits on nutrition intake 
As mentioned above, these effects are estimated by running linear 2SLS 
regressions, where the nutrition intake measures are the dependent variables and 
annual profit is an independent variable, with additional control variables XY 
being the same as those used when modeling the total treatment effect on the 
outcome variables. The main estimates of the mediation model are presented in 
Tables 5a through 5c for the three policies. 
With respect to the mediation model for extension services (Table 5a), the 
hypothesis of the exogeneity of the logarithm of profit was rejected at the five 
percent level and below for all the considered nutrition outcomes. This led us to 
estimate the model using 2SLS with the two instrumental variables. To assess the 
weakness of the instruments, we use the test proposed by  Montiel and Pflueger 
(2013), which is robust to heteroscedasticity. The results of the tests of 
overidentification and weak instruments indicate that the two instruments are 
valid and not weak at the five percent significance level. This is also the case for 
the two other mediation models (Tables 5b and 5c), which supports the use of 
instrumental variables regressions. 
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Table 5a: Results from the mediation model for extension services 
  Panel A: Second-Stage   
  Outcomes   
 Log of household 
dietary diversity 
score 
 
Log of total caloric 
intake per day and per 
capita 
Log of caloric intake 
per day and per 
capita from cereals 
 
Log of caloric intake 
per day and per 
capita from animal 
products 
Mediator     
Log of annual profit from 
livestock activity  
0.393*** 
(.113) 
-0.488** 
(.257) 
-0.787*** 
(.292) 
1.299*** 
(.548) 
Policy     
 Access to extension 
services 
0.04 
(.058) 
-0.145 
(.172) 
-0.121 
(.196) 
-0.085 
(.253) 
  Panel B: First-Stage   
  Mediator   
 Log of annual profit  Log of annual profit  Log of annual profit  Log of annual profit  
Policy     
 Access to extension 
services 
0.233** 
(.107) 
 
 
  
Instruments      
Livestock disease 
 (1 if experienced) 
0.280*** 
(.103) 
   
Annual maximal 
temperature squared 
0.004*** 
(.001) 
   
Control variables XY XY XY XY 
Test of exogeneity of log 
profit (Robust F): 
 [0.00]  [0.01]  [0.00]  [0.05] 
Test of over identifying 
restriction (Chi square 
test) 
 [0.184]  [0.377]  [0.260] [0.135] 
F-First stage of Excluded 
instruments  
13.05 13.05 13.05 6.78 
Robust Weak instrument 
statistic:  
Effective F statistic, MP 
test  
 [Critical value at level = 
10 level] 
10.84 
[7.83] 
10.85 
[7.94] 
10.85 
[7.94] 
5.83 
[7.62] 
Number of observations 595 595 595 516 
Notes: Values in brackets are critical p-values, and values in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate 
significant differences at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The robust weak instrument statistic is the one proposed 
by Olea Montiel & Pflueger (2013) and computed using a Stata package made available by Pflueger and Su (2015). MP: 
Montiel and Pflueger. 
The results of the first-stage estimation, reported in Panel B, show that households 
reporting having experienced disease problems in their herd have a higher 
observed annual profit. As stated above, one reason for this is that these 
households usually decide to sell their animals to eliminate this problem. It may 
also be that wealthier households have larger herds and therefore experience a 
higher probability of that at least one of their animals becoming sick. 
As explained above, to assess the direct effect of each policy, we must incorporate 
the treatment variable in the second stage of the 2SLS regression. This entails that 
we incorporate the treatment variable in the first stage, according to the correct 
formula for the 2SLS estimator. Using the controls XY in the 2SLS estimation 
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allows us to make more plausible not only the conditional independence of the 
treatment and the outcome but also the conditional independence of the 
instruments and the outcome. 
The first-stage estimates indicate that the coefficient of extension services on 
profits is significant in the instrumental equation for profits. This effect is similar 
to the one obtained in the previous section when estimating the effect of extension 
services on profits with IPWRA (+23 percent with the 2SLS model and +20 percent 
with IPWRA), which is reassuring. In the two other mediation models, the 
estimated effect of the policy on profits obtained from IPWRA and the one obtained 
from 2SLS are also similar. 
The effect of a one-percent increase in annual pastoral profit on a household’s 
dietary diversity score is significant and almost the same for the three policy-
specific mediation models, ranging from 0.37 to 0.39 percent. 
On the other hand, the effect of a one-percent increase in profit on total caloric 
intake per capita and per day is significant and ranges from -0.52 to -0.46 percent 
across policies. However, the significant effect of profit differs in sign depending on 
the calorie source. Increasing a household’s pastoral profits by 10 percent amounts 
to increasing its caloric intake from animal products by 13 percent and to lowering 
its caloric intake from cereals by 8 percent, on average. These results are in line 
with policies changing the dietary habits of pastoralist households towards a more 
diversified diet, including more caloric intake from animal products. This change 
may be driven by an increase in pastoral profit. 
An explanation for this result is that a higher livestock profit may correspond to 
greater specialization in pastoral activity. In Niger, specializing in livestock 
raising can be accompanied by a thorough change in a household’s lifestyle. With 
the problems of a lack of pasture and water due to frequent periods of drought, 
these households may adopt a nomadic lifestyle in search of pasture for animals. 
This can induce households to consume easily mobilizable calories in the form of 
animal products, as opposed to cereal products that may be difficult to obtain. 
Études et Documents n° 18, CERDI, 2019
33 
 
Nomadic households may also lose access to markets for specific food products, 
thereby restricting their food diversity. 
Among the three policies, only the direct effect on the dietary diversity score of low-
cost livestock feed is significant at the five percent level. The direct effects of each 
of the three policies on caloric intake from either cereals or animal food products 
are not significant at the five percent level. These results provide an indication of 
the importance of the indirect effect. 
Table 5b: Results from the mediation model for private veterinary services 
  Panel A: Second-Stage   
  Outcomes   
 
Log of household 
dietary diversity 
score 
 
Log of total caloric 
intake per day and per 
capita 
Log of caloric 
intake per day and 
per capita from 
cereals 
 
Log of caloric intake 
per day and per capita 
from animal food 
products 
Mediator     
Log of annual profit from 
livestock activity 
0.371*** 
(.110) 
-0.459** 
(.255) 
-0.739*** 
(.287) 
1.32*** 
(.553) 
Policy     
 Access to private veterinary 
services 
0.06 
(.052) 
-0.126 
(.212) 
-0.157 
(.168) 
0.114 
(.227) 
  Panel B: First Stage   
  Mediator   
 Log of annual 
profit  
Log of annual profit  Log of annual profit  Log of annual profit  
Policy     
 Access to private veterinary 
services 
0.08 
(.101) 
 
 
  
Instruments      
Livestock disease 
 (1 if experienced) 
0.264** 
(.097) 
   
Annual maximal 
temperature squared 
0.004*** 
(.001) 
   
Control variables XY XY XY XY 
Test of exogeneity of log 
profit (Robust F) 
 [0.00]  [0.02]  [0.00]  [0.05] 
Test of over identifying 
restriction: Chi square 
test  
[0.22]  [0.47]  [0.32]  [0.14] 
F-statistic for First stage 
of Excluded instruments  
 
13.95 
 
 
13.95 
 
 
13.95 
 
6.96 
Robust Weak instrument 
statistic:  
Effective F-statistic, MP 
test  
 [Critical value at level 
10 percent] 
10.52 
[9.50] 
10.52 
[9.41] 
10.52 
[9.41] 
 
5.53 
[8.64] 
 
Number of observations 595 595 595                   516 
Notes: Values in brackets are critical p-values, and values in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** imply 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The robust weak instrument computed is the one proposed by Olea 
Montiel & Pflueger (2013) and computed using a Stata package made available by Pflueger and Su (2015). MP: Montiel and 
Pflueger. 
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Moreover, changing food behavior and harmful specialization of households in 
pastoral activities may explain the negative impact of policies on total caloric 
intake. 
Table 5c: Results from the mediation model for low-cost livestock feed services 
  Panel A: Second-Stage   
  Outcomes   
 
Log of household dietary 
diversity score 
 
Log of total caloric 
intake per day and per 
capita 
Log of caloric 
intake per day 
and per capita 
from cereals 
 
Log of caloric intake 
per day and per capita 
from animal products 
Mediator     
Log of annual profit from 
livestock activity 
0.382*** 
(.106) 
-0.520 ** 
(.253) 
-0.817*** 
(.289) 
1.31** 
(.544) 
Policy     
Access to low-cost 
livestock feed 
0.146** 
(0.059) 
0.239 
(.163) 
0.302 
(.194) 
0.173 
(.246) 
  Panel B: First-Stage   
  Mediator   
 
Log of annual profit  Log of annual profit  
Log of annual 
profit  
Log of annual profit  
Policy     
 Access to low-cost 
livestock feed 
0.190 
(.126) 
   
Instruments      
Livestock disease (1 if 
experienced) 
0.272*** 
(.103) 
   
Annual maximal 
temperature squared 
0.005*** 
(.001) 
   
Control variables XY XY XY XY 
Test of exogeneity for 
log profit: Robust F 
 [0.00]  [0.01]  [0.00]  [0.04] 
Test of over identifying 
restriction: Chi square 
test  
 [0.18]  [0.48]  [0.33]  [0.16] 
F-statistic for First 
stage of Excluded 
instruments  
13.77 13.77 13.77 6.83 
Robust Weak 
instrument statistic:  
Effective F-statistic, 
MP test  
 [Critical value at 
bias=10%] 
11.18 
[8.01] 
11.18 
[8.04] 
11.18 
[8.03] 
5.82 
[7.58] 
Number of 
observations 
595 595 595 516 
Notes: Values in brackets are critical p-values, and values in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** imply 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The robust weak instrument statistic is the one proposed by Olea 
Montiel & Pflueger (2013) and computed using a Stata package made available by Pflueger and Su (2015). MP: Montiel and 
Pflueger. 
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V.4. The direct and indirect effects of the selected policies on dietary 
intake 
We now conclude the discussion. The estimated total, direct and indirect effects of 
the selected policies on dietary intake are recapitulated in Table 6. Extension 
services are the only policy with a significant impact on profits. All the indirect 
effects of extension services are significant, at least at the 10 percent level, for the 
four nutrition intake indicators. The size of these effects varies across the four 
outcomes. The estimates show that 78 percent of the effect of extension services on 
the household dietary diversity score operates through profits. Additionally, 40 
percent of the surprising negative effect of extension services on a household’s 
caloric intake from cereals is explained by the annual profit, while its direct effects 
on this outcome are not significant. 
Table 6: Decomposition of the total effect of the policies on nutrition intake 
  Policies  
 Extension services Private veterinary services Low cost livestock feed 
 TE IE DE IE/TE TE IE DE IE/TE TE IE DE IE/TE 
Outcomes             
Log of household 
dietary diversity 
score 
 
0.136*** 
(0.03) 
0.106*** 
(0.049) 
0.04 
(.058) 
0.78 
0.126*** 
(0.039) 
0.018 
(0.034) 
0.06 
(.052) 
- 
0.212*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.043 
(0.042) 
 
0.146** 
(0.059) 
- 
Log of total 
caloric intake per 
day and per 
capita 
-0.342** 
(0.133) 
-0.097* 
(.072) 
-0.145 
(.172) 
0.28 
-0.260  
(0.173) 
-0.022 
(0.047) 
-0.126 
(.212) 
- 
0.09  
(0.121) 
-0.059 
(0.065) 
0.239 
(.163) 
- 
Log of caloric 
intake per day 
and per capita 
from cereals 
 
-0.390*** 
(0.141) 
-0.157*** 
(0.09) 
-0.121 
(.196) 
0.40 
-0.327* 
(0.181) 
-0.037 
(0.07) 
-0.157 
(.168) 
- 
0.08 
(0.131) 
-0.093 
(0.094) 
0.302 
(.194) 
- 
Log of caloric 
intake per day 
and per capita 
from animal food 
products 
0.162 
(0.188) 
.261* 
(.172) 
-0.085 
(.253) 
1.61 
-0.05 
(0.223) 
0.07 
(0.126) 
0.114 
(.227) 
- 
0.267 
(0.212) 
.148 
(.181) 
0.173 
(.246) 
- 
Notes: TE= Total average treatment effect, IE= Indirect Average treatment effect through the annual livestock profit and DE= Direct Average 
treatment effect. DE represents the part of the total effect that does not operate through the annual livestock profit, which is obtained in the 
mediation model. The values in parentheses are standard errors. The standard errors for IE are computed using simulations. This test is 
similar to the delta method. *, ** and *** indicate significant differences at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Through their positive effect on profit, extension services increase the dietary 
diversity score by 10.6 percent, which represents 78 percent of their total effect on 
this outcome. Moreover, through this positive effect on profit, extension services 
decrease caloric intake from cereals by 15.7 percent (40 percent of their total effect 
on this outcome), while they increase caloric intake from animal food products by 
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26.4 percent (1.6 times their total effect on this outcome). This amounts to reducing 
total caloric intake by 9.7 percent, which represents 28 percent of their total effect 
on this outcome. 
The annual profit from livestock activity therefore appears not only as a 
substantial mediator of the effect of extension services on pastoralist households’ 
nutrition intake but also provides hints about the causes of the decline in caloric 
intake. This policy satisfied its first objective of improving pastoralist households’ 
profits, and furthermore, this improvement led to an increase in households’ 
dietary diversity score. 
In contrast, the other two policies, private veterinary services and low-cost 
livestock feed, did not significantly satisfy their objective of improving pastoral 
profits, although their total effect on the dietary diversity score is significantly 
positive. Their indirect effects on this score are insignificant and small, while only 
the direct effect of the low-cost livestock feed program on the dietary diversity score 
is significant. This suggests that profits are not a mediator of the effects of these 
policies, especially the low-cost livestock feed program given its impact on the 
dietary diversity score. Their effects may be conveyed by channels such as 
pastoralist household networks or through income sources other than pastoral 
profits. Households may not use the livestock feed they receive through the low-
cost livestock feed program to feed their animals but rather may sell it or give it to 
friends or relatives. Moreover, when they sell it, the amount of money they receive 
may be used to buy food products. When they give it away, they may receive food 
products in return. Therefore, even without increasing pastoral profit, the low-cost 
livestock feed program could enhance household nutrition intake by generating 
income or triggering the receipt of reciprocal food gifts. 
The results also suggest that the separable agricultural household model may 
remain somewhat relevant in this context, especially for those households that 
have access to extension services. Extension services may in some ways facilitate 
household access to livestock products and input markets and therefore create a 
link between the production and consumption of animal food products through 
pastoral profits. 
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VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate and estimate the causal effects on dietary intakes of 
three national agro-pastoral policies in Niger (extension services, private 
veterinary services and subsidies for low-cost livestock feed). We decompose the 
average treatment effect of each of the selected policies on household nutritional 
intake into an indirect effect—the part of the total effect that operates through the 
pastoral profit—and a residual direct effect, i.e., the part of the total effect that is 
channeled through other factors. 
The results show that extension services have a positive and significant effect on 
household dietary diversity. However, their effect on households’ total calorie 
intake is negative, presumably because households substitute small increases in 
calorie intake from animal food products for large decreases in calorie intake from 
cereals. By operating through pastoral profits to impact households’ dietary intake, 
extension services may foster the specialization of households in pastoral 
activities, which reduces their level of calorie consumption. This finding is 
consistent with pastoral profit partially (and substantially) mediating the impact 
of extension services on household calorie intake and dietary diversity. In contrast, 
pastoral profits are not found to mediate the effects of private veterinary services 
and low-cost livestock feed programs on dietary intake. For these policies, other 
unobserved channels, such as social networks and other income mechanisms, may 
play a role in conveying their effects on dietary intake. 
Overall, the estimation results show that policies designed primarily to raise 
pastoral income can partially, even substantially, contribute to enhancing 
household dietary diversity and calorie intake from animal food products for 
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Nigerien pastoralists. However, these policies should better account for agro-
pastoralists’ access to markets and whether they have a nomadic or sedentary 
lifestyle. When facing new policies, these households may shift productive 
activities to specialize more in pastoralist activities, which may change their way 
of life and restrict their access to certain food markets particularly when they 
engage in nomadism. In addition, other life choices could be spurred or hampered 
by policies, such as migrations and radicalization. 
Of course, as always, our findings are dependent on the assumptions made, 
especially those related to measurement errors in calorie intake data. A typical 
assumption is that these measurement errors are additive and random, although 
this assumption may be strong. Another limit to the use of statistical mediation 
analysis is the possible confusion between changes in the production technology 
and changes in unobserved inputs and correlations of unmeasured inputs and 
observed inputs, as noted by Heckman and Pinto (2015). Moreover, using cross-
sectional observational data implies having to assume the ignorability condition, 
which cannot be tested and may be strong. All these limitations suggest extending 
this investigation with data from more intensive surveys, in particular those 
following households over time. Finally, future research, based on richer data, 
should extend to agricultural mediator variables other than pastoral profit and 
thereby assess other channels through which policies may affect household dietary 
intake, such as changes in activity types, including migrations and radicalization. 
 
 
 
Études et Documents n° 18, CERDI, 2019
39 
 
References  
Ballo, M. and Bauer, J-M. (2013). The Economics of Early Response and 
Resilience  in Niger. Country study. Departement of International Development. 
UK GOUV.  
 
Baron, R. M., and Kenny, D. A. (1986). The Moderator-Mediator Variable 
Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual , Strategic , and 
Statistical Considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
51(6), 1173–1182. 
 
Carletto, G., Ruel, M., Winters, P., and Zezza, A. (2015). Farm-Level Pathways 
to Improved Nutritional Status Introduction to the Special Issue. The Journal 
of Development Studies,51(8), 945-957. 
 
Croppenstedt, A., and Muller, C. (2000). The Impact of Farmers’ Health and 
Nutritional Status on Their Productivity and Efficiency: Evidence from 
Ethiopia. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 48(3), 475–502.  
 
Dawson, N., Martin, A., and Sikor, T. (2016). Green Revolution in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Implications of Imposed Innovation for the Wellbeing of Rural 
Smallholders. World Development, 78, 204–218.  
 
De Brauw, A., Eoeznou, P., Gilligan, D. O., Hotz, C., Kumar, N., and 
Meenakshi, J. V. (2018). Biofortification Crop Adoption And Health 
Information: Impact Pathways In Mozambique And Uganda. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, (May), 906–930.  
 
De Janvry, A., and Sadoulet, E. (2006). Progress in the Modeling of Rural 
Households’ Behavior under Market Failures. Poverty, Inequality and 
Development, In: de Janvry A., Kanbur R. (eds) Poverty, Inequality and 
Development. Economic Studies in Inequality, Social Exclusion and Well-
Being, vol 1. Springer, Boston, MA.  
 
Dillon, A., McGee, K., and Oseni, G. (2015). Agricultural Production, Dietary 
Diversity and Climate Variability. The Journal of Development Studies, 51(8), 
976–995.  
 
Di Shu and Yi Y Grace. (2017). Causal inference with measurement error in 
outcomes: Bias analysis and estimation methods. Statistical Method in Medical 
Research.  
 
Food and Agricultural Organisation. (2016). Protection Sociale Au Sahel Et 
En Afrique De L’Ouest Renforcer la résilience au service de la securité 
alimentaire et de la nutrition.  
 
 
Études et Documents n° 18, CERDI, 2019
40 
 
Haan, D. (2016). Prospects for Livestock- Based Livelihoods in Africa ’ s Drylands. 
The World Bank Group,Washington DC. 
 
Heckman, B. J., Pinto, R., Savelyev, P., Blair, C., Benjamin, D., Browning, 
M., … Meghir, C. (2013). Understanding the Mechanisms Through Which an 
Influential Early Childhood Program Boosted Adult Outcomes. American 
Economic Review, 103(6), 2052–2086. 
 
Heckman, J. J., and Pinto, R. (2015). Econometric Mediation Analyses: 
Identifying the sources of the treatment effects from experimentally estimated 
production technologies with unmeasured and mismeasured inputs. 
Econometric Review, 34(1-2), 6–31. 
 
Imai, K., Keele, L., Tingley, D., and Yamamoto, T. (2011). Unpacking the Black 
Box of Causality: Learning about Causal Mechanisms from Experimental and 
Observational Studies. American Political Science Review, 105(4), 765–789.  
 
International Livestock Centre for Africa, I. (1988). Livestock production in 
tsetse affected areas of Africa. The African Trypanotolerant Livestock Network. 
Nairobi. 
 
Kosec, K., Ghebru, H., Holtemeyer, B., Mueller, V., and Schmidt, E. (2017). 
The Effect Of Land Access On Youth Employment And Migration Decisions: 
Evidence From Rural Ethiopia. American Journal of Agricultural Economics.  
MacKinnon, D. P., Lockwood, C. M., and Williams, J. (2004). Confidence 
limits for the indirect effect: Distribution of the product and resampling 
methods. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 39, 99-128. 
Ministère de l’Elevage, M. (2015). Guide national : Mise en place des Services 
Vétérinaires Privés de Proximité ( SVPP ) au Niger, Niamey. 
 
Ministère de l’Elevage, M. (2016). Enquete sur les revenus et la vulnérabilité des 
ménages agropastoraux et pastoraux, Niger, Niamey. 
 
Muller, C. (2009). Do agricultural outputs of autarkic peasants affect their health 
and nutrition? Evidence from Rwanda. Food Policy,34,166-175. 
 
Olea Montiel, J. L. and Pflueger, C. (2013). A robust test for weak instruments. 
Journal of Business & Economic Statitistics, 31(3), 358–369.  
 
Pflueger, C. and Wang S. (2015). A Robust Test for Weak Instruments in Stata. 
Stata Journal, 15(1):216-225. 
 
Singh, I.,Squire, L., and Strauss, J. (1986). Agricultural household models : a 
survey of recent findings and their policy implications. The World Bank 
Economic Review, 1(1), 149–179. 
 
Études et Documents n° 18, CERDI, 2019
41 
 
 
Stadlmayr, B., Charrondiere, R., Enujiugha, V., Bayili, R., Fagbohoun, E., 
Samb, B., … Burlingame, B. (2012). West African food composition table 
[Table de composition des aliments d´Afrique de l´Ouest, Food and Agricultural 
Organization.    
 
Swindale, A., and Bilinsky, P. (2006). Household Dietary Diversity Score 
(HDDS) for measurement of household food access: Indicator guide. Food and 
Nutrition Technical Assistance. USAID.  
 
United State Agency for International Development, U. (2011). Agriculture 
And Food Security Niger Fact Sheet. USAID. 
 
Vanderweele, T. J. (2015). Explanation In Causal Inference Methods for 
Mediation and Interaction. Oxford University Press. 
 
van Wessenbeeck, C.FA., M. A. Keyzer and M. Nubé (2009). Estimation of 
undernutrition and mean calorie intake in Africa: methodology, findings and 
implications. International Journal of Health and Geography, Vol. 8, N. 37. 
  
Wooldridge, J. (2010). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 
MIT Press.  
 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2007). Inverse probability weighted estimation for general 
missing data problems. Journal of Econometrics, 141(2), 1281–1301.  
 
Zezza, A., & Issa, A. (2012). Livestock in Niger: an important asset for growth and 
poverty reduction. Livestock data innovation in Africa brief ; issue no. 7. 
Washington DC ; World Bank Group.  
 
 
 
 
Études et Documents n° 18, CERDI, 2019
